Seers and Craftspeople by Bellovin, Steven Michael
Clear Text
though, is what effect these papers
(or my own new ideas from them)
are likely to have on real-world secu-
rity problems. On that, I’m becom-
ing pessimistic.
The question I’m asking now,
and the reason for my pessimism, is
rather different than, “Is this or is this
not a really cool idea?” It’s more
pragmatic: “How likely is it that this
paper will make our systems notice-
ably more secure?” I find it hard to
answer that question in the affirma-
tive for at least three reasons: past
successes, intractable problems, and
structural issues.
The bright side of the coin is that
we’ve had a lot of success thus far.
This is most evident in cryptogra-
phy, in which theorists have supplied
practitioners with far more tools
than have been deployed. Modern
ciphers, if properly used, appear to
be unbreakable. Consider the Data
Encryption Standard (DES): in
more than 30 years, exactly one at-
tack stronger than brute force has
been found, and it’s probably im-
practical. In fact, the only practical
attack—brute force—was arguably
an intentional weakness.
We’ve even seen noticeable suc-
cess in dealing with bugs. It’s no
longer a shock to see a computer
that has gone more than a year with-
out a reboot. By contrast, the main-
frames I used 40 years ago were pro-
phylactically rebooted every morn-
ing and generally crashed once or
twice in between. Because bugs are
the primary cause of security holes,
this is indeed quite significant. Un-
fortunately, we still have far to go in
this direction.
Fundamentally, writing correct
code is hard. As Fred Brooks pointed
out in his seminal essay, “No Silver
Bullet”—which you can find in his
The Mythical Man-Month (Addison-
Wesley, 1995)—it isn’t realistic to
expect an order-of-magnitude im-
provement in software productivity
in the course of a decade. I’ll make a
stronger claim: buggy code is not
only the oldest unsolved problem in
computer science, it will remain so.
We’ll never have bug-free code—
and bugs are, as noted, the leading
cause of security problems.
The structural problems in the
security field are in some sense both
the easiest and the hardest to tackle.
In Lee Smolin’s provocative book
The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of
String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and
What Comes Next (from which I
stole the title of this essay), he drew a
distinction between seers—those
who step outside of the current par-
adigm and orthodoxy to teach us a
different way to approach prob-
lems—and craftspeople—those who
fill in the missing pieces in the grand
theories that the seers create. (I’m
not qualified to judge Smolin’s as-
sessment of physics; for now, let it
suffice to say that he claims that the
deity of your choice doesn’t play
Cat’s Cradle with the universe.)
Craftspeople are very necessary;
without them, we can’t use the seers’
products. But craftspeople don’t lead
us out of the swamp when we’re lost.
Some of this dichotomy is cyclic.
Once we have a revolution in
thought, it takes a while for the
craftspeople to let us use the new
tools and see their limits. Then, and
only then, is there soil fertile enough
to grow new seers. Much of the
problem, though, lies in the way we
judge research. Peers—grant re-
viewers, tenure committees, con-
ference organizers—tend to judge
according to the current orthodoxy.
A brilliant but flawed paper—one
that boldly moves in a new direction
but obviously ignores some issues or
even creates new ones—is likely to
be rejected. After all, it has blatant
flaws, and its new ideas are unproven. 
T his is the danger we have toavoid. We need to judge new
ideas more by their potential to es-
cape today’s dead ends, and less by
what they leave unsolved. If the ideas
are good, a new generation of crafts-
people can make them useful. 
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he security research business is in trouble. Yes, it’s pro-
ducing all sorts of fascinating new papers, ones that
demand to be read. I count a conference a success if 
I get one neat new idea of my own to think about; at
one recent conference, I got two in one day. The problem,
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